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Abstract
Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said. This has conse-
quences for philosophical accounts of meaning, communication, and propo-
sitional attitude reports. I argue that the consequence we should endorse
is that utterances typically express many propositions, that these are what
speakers mean, and that the correct semantics for attitude reports will
handle this fact while being relational and propositional.
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1 Introduction
According to many philosophers of language there are things that we mean
i.e. propositions. There is an intuitively clear, but theoretically complex, distinc-
tion between a speaker meaning what a sentence they utter means and meaning
something else. H. P. Grice marked this distinction as between what is said and
what is implicated; the distinction is the important thing, not the terminology.
One way to formulate a theory of communication which provides a framework for
making this distinction is to describe sentences, in context, as having contents
determined by the linguistic properties, in context, of the components of these
sentences and the way they combine. These contents are propositions. When one
intends to communicate a proposition which is the content of the sentence one
utters, one has said that proposition; intending to indirectly convey a distinct
proposition also entails that one means it but not that one says it. The success
of the intentions of the speaker can then be defined in terms of the uptake of the
proposition meant. I will be defending a version of this view, with a significant
amendment: multiple propositions are said, in the appropriate technical sense,
by most utterances.
I will argue that the move to the multiple proposition view is the most conser-
vative response to a challenge that arises for the standard view of content and
communicative success. The challenge has been raised most effectively by Ray
Buchanan (Buchanan 2010, 2012, 2013). My paper can be best understood as
accepting several of Buchanan’s key premises while rejecting his conclusions; I
will do this by offering an alternative theory of content and communication. The
multiple proposition view plays a key role in my alternative theory. I defend
the multiple proposition view on the basis that the theory that entails it is
overall simpler and more powerful than the alternative. Someone who accepts
Buchanan’s premises should then accept the multiple proposition view rather
than Buchanan’s own solution to the challenge that Buchanan raises to the
standard view.
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A key premise of Buchanan’s argument, which I accept, is the underdeterminacy
thesis (section 2). This is the thesis that the linguistic meaning of a sentence,
even in context, does not fix what is said, in a certain technical sense, by an
utterance of that sentence in that context. There are of course debates about
whether the underdeterminacy thesis is true of natural languages; I will just
assume that it is because I am interested in exploring its consequences. There
is also a risk of terminological confusion around the underdeterminacy thesis.
Unfortunately, there is no way to frame the thesis in a way that respects all the
various ways that philosophers of language and linguists have used terms like
‘what is said’ and ‘linguistic meaning’. I will now explain how I will be using the
terms in this paper.
I assume that the parts of sentences have semantic properties. These are context
invariant and combine in various ways which results in the semantic properties
of sentences i.e. their context insensitive linguistic meanings. These linguistic
meanings interact with contexts of utterance and the result is the content of
the sentence in that context; it is a substantial question whether these contents
are always or sometimes full propositions. In addition to this notion of sentence
content there is a conceptually distinct level of what is said. This is fully
propositional content that may be identical to the content arising from linguistic
meaning and context or may be a development of it. The contrast that the notion
is supposed to help us to formulate is between a content conveyed directly via
the sentence uttered and one conveyed indirectly by means such as implicature.
Examples of something that falls on one side or the other are controversial:
in particular, those who reject the underdeterminacy thesis often argue that
something that is intuitively conveyed is an implicature rather than part of
what is said. Furthermore, the identification of what is said often relies on
theorists’ intuitions, or a range of diagnostics which are themselves controversial.
Some of these difficulties will not be relevant to my argument in this paper.
It would be enough for my purposes to get agreement just on the point that
there are things that speakers mean that are very closely related to the contents
of the sentences that they are utter, and other things that are not of which
conversational implicatures are the paradigm example. When I argue, as I will
in what follows, that there are multiple propositions that are said, this is the
main idea I am defending: multiple propositions are conveyed in this way and
not in the implicature way.1
2 Underdeterminacy
For concreteness, I will focus on just one formulation of the underdeterminacy
thesis, the version defended by Robyn Carston (Carston 2002, 19).
1I should also address the question of literalness, if only to say that I will avoid using the
term ‘literal’ because of its potential for confusion. Literal meaning could just be what is said,
in which case I have the same view about the former as the latter, of course. It could also
be used to identify something like linguistic meaning or content in context. This means that
the question of whether the multiple proposition view I defend is a novel view about what is
literal is really a question of whether what is literal is identical to what is said. I should note
that I do not intend this as a view about any particular technical use of the term ‘literal’; I
merely want to make it clear that I can answer the question about whether my view is that
there are multiple literal contents, but that I think that the question is terminological.
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Underdeterminacy Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said.
Both ‘linguistic meaning’ and ‘what is said’ are terms of art. I will be following
Carston’s usage throughout this paper.
Linguistic Meaning The linguistic meaning of a sentence (in context) is what
it encodes in virtue of the meanings of its parts (in context) and the way
they combine.
What is Said What is said by the utterance of a sentence in context is the
proposition(s) that hearers take to be communicated, or expressed, by that
utterance.
As used here, express is a term for something that speakers do, just like com-
municate; note that ‘express’ is not used to pick out a semantic property of the
sentence used, as ‘encode’ would be by Carston. Speakers express propositions
by uttering sentences; I will sometimes use the formulation that the utterance of
the sentence expresses what the utterer expresses.
As Carston notes, and discusses at length in Carston (2002, chaps 1–2); Carston
(2008), the notion of what is said that is being used here is more restrictive than
at least some uses of the term. What is said, in this sense, does not include
implicature, nor some examples of nonliteral speech such as irony. What is said,
in this sense, tracks a psychologically real category of intuitive truth conditions;
see also Recanati (2001); Recanati (2002); Recanati (2004). Theorists disagree
about what counts as what is said as opposed to what is implicated (or conveyed
in some similar nonliteral way). This is an important question but it is not one
that I need to resolve in order to make the argument I want to make in this paper.
The important point is that there is such a distinction, and Underdeterminacy
is defined in its terms. Underdeterminacy must be understood in these terms
in order to be an interesting thesis. Suppose ‘what is said’ was used to pick
out a more expansive concept such that it included clear cases of implicature.
Everybody agrees that linguistic meaning underdetermines what is implicated,
so Underdeterminacy would be trivially true. Furthermore, given that everybody
agrees that a sentence can encode one thing and implicate something distinct,
it follows that utterances can express multiple propositions. So the multiple
proposition view would be uncontroversial if ‘express’ and ‘what is said’ are used
in this broad way.2
Carston gives a variety of examples in the course of her defence of Underdeter-
minacy including (1).
(1) This steak is raw.
Focusing on the adjective ‘raw’, Carston’s claim is that it can be used to express
a range of concepts depending on various contextual factors. In one sort of
standard case it might be used to express RAW*: a concept of being somewhat
cooked but insufficiently to eat. In another slightly different context the concept
expressed might be RAW**. This variation is what makes it plausible that,
2Another point to note here is that the definition given in What is said appeals to the
intuitive judgements of speakers and hearers. This raises complex questions about whether
speakers and hearers must explicitly entertain the propositions in question. For my purposes,
I need only the idea that these propositions capture the intuitive truth conditions of the
utterance that are in principle available to competent speakers even if they are not explicitly
entertained; see Recanati (2001); Recanati (2004).
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even if there is a concept that ‘raw’ encodes as its meaning, that is not what
it contributes to what is said in a range of quite ordinary cases. Whether or
not there is such an encoded concept doesn’t matter for the present argument.
Carston writes in Carston (2002) that there is, and in Carston (2012) that there
isn’t; see Huang (2017) for discussion and references. One could of course give
many other examples. Colour terms such as ‘red’ are popular in the literature.
It is clear from Carston’s presentation of the view that the scope of her theory is
very ordinary utterances of very ordinary sentences. People often utter sentences
like (1), and often say things involving concepts like RAW*, in quite ordinary
situations. There is nothing exotic about the syntax and semantics of (1), nor
the kind of situation which provides the data for Carston’s theory.
There is no obvious way to localise the variability to something that can be
neatly isolated and treated as a special property of a special class of expressions.
So, if Carston’s view is correct the point generalises to a wide range of natural
language utterances. Carston claims that it applies to every natural language
utterance. This may well be true, but the weaker claim that Underdeterminacy
is true of a large number of utterances will do for my argument here.
To structure the presentation of my argument I will discuss another recent
attempt to engage with these issues. Buchanan has raised a series of problems
about meaning and communication (Buchanan 2010, 2012). The claim is that, if
one accepts certain views about language, including the underdeterminacy thesis,
that are both plausible and popular, one cannot also accept what Buchanan calls
the standard view about meaning and communication. Nor can one accept a
certain popular Gricean account of meaning. Nor can one accept a certain view
of the semantics of propositional attitude reports i.e. the view that ‘that’-clauses
denote propositions.
I will argue for the following three claims:
1. While Buchanan’s argument does indeed give reason to reject the standard
view, it does not give reason to reject an amended view that captures the
central idea of the standard view.
2. While Buchanan’s argument does indeed give reason to reject a certain
version of a Gricean account of meaning, it does not give reason to reject
an amended view that captures the central idea of that Gricean account.
3. Buchanan’s argument does not give reason to reject a relational account of
attitude reports.
All three points rely on the thesis that theorists of language should proliferate
contents, i.e. that we should accept that it is commonplace for a sentence in
context to be used to express many propositions; express here corresponds to
‘what is said’ in Carston’s sense. Equivalently, the idea will be that speakers
utter these sentences and mean many propositions, and say them.
The view I will defend in this paper, presented in section 4, section 5, section 6,
and section 7, is that perfectly ordinary utterances of simple declarative sentences
typically express multiple propositions. This means that I deny the claim that
an utterance typically expresses as many propositions as it contains clauses.3
3I am not merely endorsing the standard view that a single utterance can convey more than
one thing in the broadest possible sense of ‘convey’ that includes e.g. conversational implicature.
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3 Buchanan’s argument
Buchanan presents his argument with specific cases and then seeks to generalise
them. The example I will focus on is (2).
(2) Every beer is in the bucket.
Buchanan provides the following context for an utterance of (2).
An hour before the party is to begin, Tim asks Chet ‘Are we ready
to rage?’ ‘So bro’, Chet responds, ‘We are totally ready. The living
room totally looks like a pirate ship. The strobe lights are up. Every
beer is in the bucket. I just need to find an eye patch to wear with
this pirate hat.’ (Buchanan 2010, 347)
Buchanan argues that this seemingly ordinary exchange raises a series of problems
for traditional views of meaning and communication. The problems are generated
by Underdeterminacy.
1. The domain over which the quantifier phrase ‘every beer’ ranges is restricted
in a way not fully determined by the linguistic meaning of that expression.
2. The referent of the (incomplete) definite description ‘the bucket’ is not
fixed by the linguistic meaning of that expression.
In both these cases, according to Buchanan, we should think of the linguistic
meaning of the respective expressions as something incomplete; he calls these
‘templates’ or ‘TEMPs’.4 My position in this paper will be to accept Buchanan’s
claim about the linguistic meaning of these expressions. I do this because I
am interested in the consequences that he draws from the view. Furthermore,
as (1) from section 1 shows, nothing much hangs on the use of examples that
involve quantifier domain restriction or incomplete definite descriptions. A
similar argument could be constructed with ‘raw’ or ‘red’ in very ordinary
cases of Underdeterminacy. Given that Underdeterminacy generalises and that
Buchanan’s arguments are based on Underdeterminacy, Buchanan’s arguments
will generalise.
The other example Buchanan gives is non-sentential assertions such as
(3) a health inspector
I will focus on the quantifier domain restriction case, but I think that the argument
is just as good when applied to non-sentential assertion. For a discussion and
Anybody who believes in conversational implicature endorses that view: if a speaker sometimes
conveys P by saying it and Q by implicating it then two propositions have been conveyed,
in the broad sense, by the utterance of a single sentence. The multiple proposition view is
different in kind to this proposal because it claims that more than one proposition is conveyed
by being said; these propositions are not implicatures and the multiple proposition view does
not have anything distinctive to say about implicature. There are good reasons to think that
standard attributions of saying allow for multiplicity (Cappelen and Lepore 2004). My claim
is that a narrower and more theoretical notion of saying also allows for multiple propositions
to be expressed, and that endorsing such a view is the best response to Buchanan’s argument
as well as generally theoretically fruitful. Similarly, I concede that ordinary uses of terms like
‘convey’, ‘express’, ‘communicate’ often seem to track a broader notion. I intend to use them
in the narrower sense that theorists have in mind when they discuss Underdeterminacy.
4Some theorists with this sort of view call such things ‘propositional radicals’, ‘propositional
skeletons’, or ‘propositional schemata’; for the purposes of this paper there are no important
differences between these.
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defence of non-sentential assertion with references to the literature see Stainton
(2005).5
4 The ‘standard view’
4.1 Content and success
Buchanan says that the standard view of meaning and communication among
theorists of language is constituted by the following theses (Buchanan 2010, 342).
Content What a speaker means, or intends to communicate, (at least in cases
of indicative speech) must be a proposition.
Success Understanding a speaker’s utterance U requires (minimally) entertain-
ing what they meant by U.
Content, I take it, is intended by Buchanan to require that there is a single
proposition in question i.e. the proposition that the speaker intends to com-
municate and the proposition that the audience must entertain. Buchanan’s
argument applies only to that way of understanding Content and Success. If,
however, one construes Content and Success in a way that allows for a multiple
proposition view then the argument does not succeed. This is the line of thought
I will follow in the rest of this paper.6
Here is my formulation of Buchanan’s argument against the standard view.
1. The utterance of (2) in the context given was an instance of successful
linguistic communication.
2. So, the audience must have entertained the unique proposition that the
speaker meant. (From Content and Success)
3. So, there is a unique proposition such that it is a necessary condition for
successful communication that the audience entertained it. (From premises
1 and 2)
4. But, there is no such proposition.
5. So, we must deny premise 1 or 2. (From premises 3 and 4)
6. It is better to deny premise 2. The conjunction of Content and Success
entails premise 2, so we must deny at least one of them too.
5Buchanan’s example, involving both an incomplete definite description and quantifier
domain restriction, suggests a connection to the extended discussion of these phenomena in
contemporary philosophy of language. Indeed, my own view is partly inspired by a point made
in that literature as I note in subsection 6.2. See Evans (1982, sec. 9.7); Neale (1993, sec.
3.7); Neale (2000); Neale (2004, 105–11) for discussion. Both Buchanan’s view and mine are
compatible with what Stephen Neale calls the ‘implicit Russellian’ response to incompleteness.
This is an important observation about the phenomenon, however, as I have emphasised,
Underdeterminacy is more general than the kind of incompleteness at issue here: ‘raw’ and
‘red’ can be used to generate examples. This is of course assuming that Carston and those
with similar views are right in their views. I have assumed this for the sake of argument, and
as it happens I believe it. I thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion that this point
should be explicitly noted.
6Note that Content is not describing what some theorists might call semantic content and
define as the proposition assigned to a sentence in context. If Underdeterminacy is true then
there is no such thing, and that is being assumed at this point in the paper. Content in the
current sense is what Carston would call ‘what is said’, and can also be thought of as what is
expressed by an utterance of a sentence.
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Premise 1 is supposed to capture an intuitive sense in which an attempt at
linguistic communication can be successful. The attempt to give a philosophical
account of this is partly what this paper, and Buchanan’s work, is about i.e. the
Content and Success theses and the amendments to them I will defend. Premise
1 relies on the pre-theoretical idea that communication can succeed or fail: the
audience either understands what the speaker is saying, or they don’t.
Premise 4 is a key step. Buchanan’s claim is that Underdeterminacy entails this
premise. Therefore Underdeterminacy is incompatible with the standard view
because it entails a premise in a sound argument against it. Premise 4 is the
denial of premise 3. What is being denied is that there is a proposition such
that entertaining it is a necessary condition for communicative success. It will
be important to the argument to follow that the denial of premise 3 is not the
denial that there are propositions which play a role in communicative success.
Buchanan justifies this key step from Underdeterminacy to premise 4 in the
following way. Suppose that the linguistic meaning of (2) is a template. Following
Buchanan (2010, 348) I will label it ‘TEMP’ and use the following notation:
TEMP [The y: Bucket(y) & _ y] ([Every x: Beer(x) & _ x] (x is in y))
On this view, the linguistic meaning of (2) is TEMP which is not what the
speaker means or the audience grasps. The specifics of TEMP do not really
matter for the argument I am interested in; any view on which linguistic meaning
is obviously not what the speaker means or the audience grasps will generate
the issue.
This is the main place that Underdeterminacy plays a role in the argument
against the standard view. Suppose that, contra Underdeterminacy, the linguistic
meaning of (2), once context is fixed, determines a proposition, and that this is
what Chet said. That proposition, the encoded content of (2) in the context,
would be a good candidate for being the unique proposition entertaining of which
is necessary for communicative success.7 But, (2) lacks such a good candidate,
because of Underdeterminacy. And, if Underdeterminacy is as general as Carston,
Buchanan, and I believe, then there is nothing special about (2).
A related point is that someone might try to motivate a version of the argument
without Underdeterminacy. The idea I have in mind is that someone might
say that for a range of sentences it is the case that when people utter them
they have no communicative intentions such they will be satisfied only by one
particular proposition being entertained. This might be posited as a special
feature of quantifier domains and/or definite descriptions; these features would
then apply to (2). Someone who thinks that will reject the conjunction of
Content and Success, because they accept premise 4, but not because they accept
Underdeterminacy. They will take it that the standard view fails for at least a
range of cases. I have no objection to such a view. The positive points I make in
section 5, section 6, and section 7 do not rely on any particular way of motivating
the rejection of the formulation of the standard view as the conjunction of
7One might still think that entertaining that proposition would not be sufficient for success,
perhaps because one thinks that the proposition encoded is that every beer that exists is in the
uniquely existing bucket i.e. something absurd and obviously false. On such a view entertaining
that proposition might be a necessary condition for communicative success, perhaps because
what the speaker meant must be inferred from such a proposition.
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Content and Success. However, my way of motivating the rejection of the
standard view is by appealing to Underdeterminacy. One feature of this is that
the argument will apply very widely, given the ubiquity of Underdeterminacy.
Now consider the following descriptions of ways in which TEMP might be ‘filled
in’ each of which is supposed to represent a distinct proposition (call these
P1–P6):
1. Every beer we bought at the bodega is in the bucket in the backyard.
2. Every beer we will serve at the party is in the bucket decorated in pirate
motif.
3. Every beer for our guests is in the bucket filled with ice.
4. Every beer at the apartment is in the bucket next to the hot tub.
5. Every beer we bought at the bodega is in the bucket next to the hot tub.
6. Every beer at the apartment is in the bucket in the backyard.
P1–P6 are all propositions that are compatible with TEMP in the context of
utterance specified for (2). In this context, being compatible with TEMP is
being a way in which the blanks in TEMP might be acceptably filled in. Exactly
which propositions are compatible depends on context. How this works is a
complex question although it is clear that there are restrictions (Stanley and
Szabó 2000; Hall 2008; Pupa 2015). For the sake of simplicity I will pretend
that P1–P6 are all the compatible propositions; the argument requires only that
there is some number of such propositions greater than one.8
4.2 The multiple proposition view
In my reconstruction of Buchanan’s argument the important claim is that no one
of P1–P6 is such that it is a necessary condition for successful communication
that Tim entertains it. Chet will certainly have succeeded in his attempt at
communication if Tim entertains any five of P1–P6; and, arguably, Chet would
succeed even if Tim entertains only one. No proposition is such that if Tim fails
to entertain it then the attempt at communication has failed. So, no proposition
is such that it is a necessary condition for successful communication that the
audience entertains it. Underdeterminacy comes in to play because, if (1) had
as its linguistic meaning some proposition Q, then it would be plausible that the
audience entertaining Q was a necessary condition for successful communication
(which is not to say that Chet would have had to intend to communicate Q, nor
that Tim would have had to think that he did). This shows that P1–P6, which
are standing in for the entire set of propositions compatible with TEMP in the
8I will make the simplifying assumption that the boundary of the set of propositions is clear
and precise; issues to do with vagueness may complicate things. This might form the basis of
an objection to my version of the multiple proposition view. Assume for the sake of argument
that the set of propositions is vague. If, as I will argue, the speaker has said, and means, all
of the propositions in the set, it will follow that it is vague what the speaker has said and
means. More precisely, there will be a range of borderline cases which are propositions such
that it is indeterminate whether or not the speaker has said or means that proposition. This
may be considered a troublesome result. However, it does not suggest that communication
is impossible which is the consequence of simply accepting Buchanan’s argument without
modifying the standard view. Nor does it give up the traditional account of communication in
terms of propositions. These propositions need not be vague in any sense. So, I claim, even
if the multiple proposition view does have this consequence it has compensating theoretical
virtues.
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context, cannot be distinguished regarding communicative success; none of them
are special. If that is granted then premise 4 of the argument must be granted,
and therefore the conjunction of Content and Success must be denied.
There is, however, a relatively conservative fix for the problem. Content and
Success are vulnerable when they are read in such a way that there must be one
unique proposition that is the content of an utterance, and that communication
is successful only if it is entertained. These constraints can be relaxed. One
way to reformulate Content and Success would be as follows (amendments to
Content and Success have been emphasised).
Content 2 What a speaker means, or intends to communicate, (at least in
cases of indicative speech) must be a proposition or set of propositions.
Success 2 Understanding a speaker’s utterance U requires (minimally) enter-
taining one or more of the propositions that they meant by U.
The conjunction of Content 2 and Success 2 is not refuted by premise 4, so
this variation on the standard view is compatible with Underdeterminacy. The
revised theses avoid the problem with premise 4 because they do not entail
that there is a single proposition that the speaker means, nor that there is a
single proposition such that entertaining it is a necessary condition for successful
communication. So, if someone finds the standard view compelling, and is also
convinced by the various arguments for Underdeterminacy, then I suggest that
they should take this variation seriously.
What I am proposing is an amended version of the standard view which, I claim,
captures what is attractive about the original version while accommodating
Underdeterminacy. Such a view is worth endorsing because it retains the
centrality of propositions to theories of language and communication.
The view that follows from Content 2 and Success 2 is a multiple proposition view:
it is a view according to which, at least sometimes, more than one proposition is
expressed. More specifically, all of these propositions are expressed in just the
same way that what is said is expressed. The difference is that there are many of
them. I would also claim that they are all literal, with the caveats about how to
understand ‘literal’ already given in section 1. This, I claim, is a way to respond
to Buchanan’s argument without either rejecting Underdeterminacy, or rejecting
a theory that defines meaning and communication in terms of propositions.
This account of content has been motivated by an argument based on Underde-
terminacy. I should make clear that the multiple proposition view is intended
to be compatible with Underdeterminacy, and is compatible with it. None of
the propositions in the set are encoded as the linguistic meaning of the uttered
sentence. So, no proposition that is said is encoded as linguistic meaning, and
the set isn’t either. Proposing Content 2 as part of the multiple proposition view
is therefore not denying Underdeterminacy.
An important issue that must be resolved is how to think about a speaker meaning
a set of propositions, which is what Content 2 claims they can do. The short
answer is that speaker means those propositions that they intend to communicate,
and a speaker can intend to communicate more than one proposition. Fleshing
this picture out will require thinking about the relationship between meaning
and the phenomenon driving Buchanan’s argument. I will turn to this question
10
in section 6.
Before that, in section 5, I will present the conclusion I want to draw from my
discussion of Buchanan’s argument in a way that is more independent of his
presentation.
5 Communication and content
5.1 The role of propositions
I take it to be uncontroversial that two interconnected projects in philosophy of
language focus on the nature of (linguistic) communication and the nature of
content. The interconnection follows from the fact that various sorts of contents
are candidates for being the objects of communication, therefore theories of one
have consequences for theories of the other.
What Buchanan calls the standard view takes contents to be propositions
and thinks of communication in terms of speakers intending to communicate
propositions. The method by which speakers try to communicate propositions
is uttering sentences. These sentences have linguistic meaning, in Carston’s
sense as described in section 1, which is compositionally determined. Linguistic
meaning might not be propositional, on this view. As well as linguistic meaning
there is what is said by the speaker in uttering that sentence, with its linguistic
meaning, in the context. The point of Underdeterminacy, as defended by Carston
and accepted by both Buchanan and me, is that what is said is not identical
to linguistic meaning. What is said is defined in terms of what the audience
entertains, and what the speaker means is what they intend their audience to
entertain. So, these notions, meaning, in the sense of what the speaker means
rather than linguistic meaning, and what is said, naturally fit together.
On what Buchanan calls the standard view they do naturally fit together. The
speaker means a proposition. They utter a sentence which has that proposition as
its linguistic meaning. If all goes well the audience identifies that very proposition
as the linguistic meaning of that sentence in that context. This process may
go wrong when the speaker and their audience have conflicting beliefs about
e.g. which sentence was uttered, the way its parts combine to form a meaning,
or the nature of the context. In a range of ordinary cases nothing does go wrong
and communication succeeds.
As Buchanan argues, I think convincingly, Underdeterminacy requires us to
abandon this standard view provided that we think that communication does
succeed in lots of cases. I presented a version of his argument in section 4. Where
we differ is in the response we want to make to this result.
My proposal is to retain the idea that propositions are the objects of communica-
tion in that they are what speakers mean. They are also what hearers entertain
and communicative success is defined in terms of them. My, perhaps radical,
proposal is that speakers mean a multiplicity of propositions. This proposal is
captured by my amended versions of Content and Success in section 4.
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5.2 Defending the multiple proposition view
I take this view, which is a sort of multiple proposition view and might be
described as ‘propositional proliferation’, to be motivated by both detailed argu-
ments such as my reconstruction of Buchanan’s argument against the standard
view and also by a bigger picture conception of the relationship between content
and communication.
I have in mind the following idea. There are contents, propositions, about which
it is possible to form metaphysical theories. These are the contents of beliefs
and the objects of communication. So, in a sense that can be specified in a
philosophical theory, we communicate our thoughts to one another by using
language. However, language does not encode contents even when the effects of
context are accounted for. So, we do not communicate by encoding our thoughts
in language or relying on the linguistic meaning of an utterance being identical
to the content we intend to communicate. Instead we communicate by uttering
a sentence with a certain linguistic meaning and intend that at least some of
the things we mean will be grasped by our audience. Put another way, we
express our thoughts multiply by exploiting the linguistic meanings of uttered
sentences. There are many things we express, and many true, partial answers to
the question of what we expressed when we made a particular utterance.
One might ask whether this view is important philosophically, and therefore
worth defending. I think it is, for two related reasons. Firstly, the view gives
a central role to propositions in a unified account of the contents of belief and
the objects of communication i.e. the things we mean. This has been a major
theme of twentieth century analytic philosophy of language. It is on this point
that my position differs from Buchanan’s and I claim that this is an advantage
for my view. I don’t mean that we should preserve a theory simply because
it has previously been popular; that would be far too conservative. There is
a tradition because there are good reasons for there to be. Discussion of this
tradition and recent work within it can be found in Stevens (2004); King (2007);
Gaskin (2008); Soames (2010); Collins (2011); King, Soames, and Speaks (2014);
Hanks (2015); Merricks (2015); Soames (2015).
Secondly, the view allows for a clear and attractive picture of the relationship
between propositions and sentences. Consider a view that posits a direct con-
nection between the linguistic meaning of a sentence and a proposition that it is
used to say. The standard view invited this identification because, on that view,
what is said is a single proposition. So, it would seem plausible to think, the
linguistic meaning ought to be that very proposition. This would then suggest
that the way to proceed is to give an account of linguistic meaning that has that
result. I have in mind one or other version of minimalism or indexicalism. The
multiple proposition view does not invite this temptation.
Of course, those who identify linguistic meaning with propositions will not accept
the above as an argument for the multiple proposition view. However, it is
not intended to be. The argument for the view is the response to Buchanan’s
argument against the standard view which concludes in endorsing Content 2,
Success 2 (and, optionally, an amendment of our understanding of meaning to
be discussed in section 6). My point is that the multiple proposition view is a
distinctive philosophical position and that once it has been argued for it suggests
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a certain way of looking at other debates which, I claim, is likely to be fruitful.
This is the greatest advantage of the way of looking at content and communication
that follows from adopting the multiple proposition view. It is an advantage
because it avoids what I take to be objectionable theories both about the nature
of sentences and propositions that are motivated by the desire to maintain
that linguistic meaning is propositional. I will not try to defend the claim that
these theories are objectionable. For recent work on this question see Collins
(2007); Hodgson (2013b). My claim is that the multiple proposition view offers
a perspective from which these debates can be viewed which is both distinctive
and illuminating.
I am not the first to claim that there can be more thoughts expressed than
clauses, but I extend the view beyond a limited range of constructions such as
(alleged) devices of conventional implicature. I will argue that the phenomenon
is ubiquitous and follows from a basic feature of natural language. There are
related views in the literature (Bach 1999; Neale 1999; Dever 2001; Corazza
2002; Braun and Sider 2007; Egan 2009; von Fintel and Gillies 2011; Perry 2012;
Sullivan 2013; Dorr and Hawthorne 2014). My view can be situated amongst
these, but it is not identical to any one of them.
6 Meaning and communicative intentions
6.1 The Gricean inheritance
Grice gave a famous definition of one sort of meaning (he has in mind non-natural
meaning, roughly, the sort of meaning that utterances have rather than the way
that smoke means fire).
“A meant [non-naturally] something by x” is (roughly) equivalent to
“A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience
by means of the recognition of this intention”[.] (Grice 1957, 385)
Philosophers and linguists have developed accounts of meaning based on this
basic insight, and have criticised and amended it in various ways. My project in
this section is to show how a view which includes this basic Gricean idea can
accommodate the issues raised by Buchanan’s arguments. I won’t offer a general
defence of a Gricean approach to meaning.9
Because my argument in this section is related only to Gricean intentions it could
be separated from my arguments related to the standard view in section 4 without
affecting the points I make in those sections. However, the current discussion
of intentions is necessary to make those arguments relevant to those views that
give a central role to communicative intentions. In particular, my formulation of
the revised multiple proposition version of the standard view involves the notion
of meaning. A Gricean, or anyone who thinks that communicative intentions are
central to meaning, will want to know whether the multiple proposition view can
say something intelligible about communicative intentions in order to support
the appeal to meaning.
9Buchanan (2010 endnote 7) cites Davis (1992); Davis (2002) as an alternative view. Bar-On
(2013) presents a useful discussion of the engagement between ‘post-Gricean’ relevance theorists
such as Origgi and Sperber (2000) and non-Griceans such as Millikan (1987) on this question.
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6.2 Meaning and asserting
The Gricean conception of meaning described in subsection 6.1 requires the
speaker to intend to have an effect, i.e., in this case of verbal communication, that
the audience entertain a proposition, by means of the recognition of that intention.
Buchanan’s view is that a speaker cannot reasonably have such an intention when
using a natural language that has the property of Underdeterminacy. There is
another way to respond, at least in principle, which is to claim that there are
certain intentions that it is possible to have in conditions of Underdeterminacy
which do underwrite attributions of meaning.
Firstly, I propose that there is a general intention that the speaker has towards
a set of propositions. The intention is that one or more of these propositions
is entertained by the audience. I leave open whether the speaker has to be
thinking of those propositions as the propositions such that they intend that the
audience entertains one of them. It would be enough for my purposes merely
that their intention does in fact determine a set of propositions; dispositions
to be satisfied with certain outcomes may well be relevant here. This is not a
Gricean communicative intention: there is no requirement for the speaker to
intend that the entertaining happens on the basis of recognising this set directed
intention. This avoids the requirement that the audience in some way recognises
which set of propositions is intended.
Secondly, I propose that because the speaker has this intention directed at a set
of propositions, in the example borrowed from Buchanan this will be P1–P6,
they have a special sort of intention directed at each member of that set. I will
call this an intention*. What makes an intention* special is that it is parasitic
on an intention that can be satisfied in multiple ways, and is directed at one of
the ways in which it would be satisfied. Because the speaker has an intention
that one or more of P1–P6 is entertained by their audience they therefore have
an intention* directed at each proposition in that set that it is entertained. The
key difference between having this intention* and the corresponding intention is
that the intention* is not thwarted if the particular proposition it is directed
at is not entertained. My preferred way of thinking about these intentions* is
as corresponding to the set of sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of the
intention they are derived from.
I have called intentions* a special sort of intention. This might suggest an
objection: if intentions* are intentions then the account will fail because of
Buchanan’s argument, and if they’re not it is (i) unclear what they are and (ii)
unclear whether they can feature in Gricean theories of meaning and commu-
nication. My response is that strictly speaking intentions* are not intentions.
They are states that a subject is in. They are in those states in virtue of having
an intention that can be satisfied multiple ways, but which cannot be identified
with a broader intention. This is the structure of the communicative case. The
speaker’s intention would be satisfied by the audience entertaining any one of
P1–P6, but cannot be reduced to the intention that they entertain the set or
a disjunction (or disjunction of conjunctions of proper subsets). The speaker’s
intentions determine their intentions*. I call intentions* a sort of intention
because I want to emphasise that they can be used in Gricean theory: what
I mean is that they can play the roles required of intentions in that theory. I
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would be happy to concede that they are not intentions in any sense as long as
it is accepted that they can play the required role.
In order to vindicate the claim about roles it will be necessary to show that
intentions* can be recognised. I think that they can, because recognition of an
intention* can be reduced to partial recognition of an intention. Recall that
intentions* correspond to ways that a particular intention would be satisfied.
Recognising an intention*, I claim, is recognising that the subject has an intention
that would be satisfied in that way. This does not fully characterise the subject’s
intention; it is recognition that the intention has a property. I know of no reason
to think that the above description does not pick out something possible. If it is
possible to recognise an intention to get one to entertain P on the basis of an
utterance then surely it is possible to recognise that the speaker has an intention
that would be satisfied in a particular way i.e. by the audience entertaining P.
When an intention can be satisfied more than one way, I know of no reason to
think that the ways cannot be recognised independently of one another. That is
just what it is to recognise an intention*.
It is possible for the speaker to have a Gricean communicative intention*. In that
case, I propose, the speaker means the proposition they intend* their audience to
entertain. A speaker will typically have intentions* towards several propositions:
they mean them all. My proposal is therefore that the Gricean definition of
meaning, as formulated in Buchanan (2010, 343) as M*, be amended from
Meaning to Meaning 2.
Meaning A speaker means the proposition P by uttering U only if, for some
audience A, they produce U intending that (i) A come to entertain P on
the basis of their utterance, (ii) A recognise their intention (i), at least in
part, on the basis of the fact that she uttered U.
Meaning 2 A speaker means the proposition P by uttering U only if, for some
audience A, they produce U intending* that (i) A come to entertain P on
the basis of their utterance, (ii) A recognise their intention* (i), at least in
part, on the basis of the fact that she uttered U.
In both these definitions the things that speakers mean are propositions. Uttering
a sentence is a kind of action and the intentions/intentions* that the speaker has
when they make the utterance fix which proposition, or propositions they mean.
The objects of intentions and intentions* are states of affairs e.g. A’s coming to
entertain P. Note that in both cases the intention/intention* in question applies
to both conditions (i) and (ii): the speaker intends/intends* that the audience
entertains P on the basis of recognising that very intention/intention*.
This would be a relatively conservative change to the definition of meaning.
It is recognisably Gricean while dealing with Buchanan’s problem. It is also
compatible with Content 2 and Success 2 from section 4, and would account
for the definition of those theses in terms of sets of propositions. My claim is
that Content 2 and Success 2 are plausible because they reflect the definition of
meaning captured in Meaning 2, and the intuitions that they are designed to
capture are connected to what speakers mean.
I will say something in subsection 6.3 to further motivate the introduction of
intention*. Before that I would like to make explicit the structure of my argument
for introducing it. Consider the context of Chet and Tim’s exchange.
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1. The utterance of (2) in the context given was an instance of successful
linguistic communication.
2. A broadly Gricean theory of communication in terms of the recognition of
intentions is true.
3. So, Tim (the audience) must have recognised an intention of Chet’s (the
speaker).
4. No standard intention will do, for reasons given by Buchanan.
5. So, some kind of non-standard intention, intention*, is present to account
for premises 1 and 3.
I take premise 5 to follow as an inference to the best explanation from premises
1, 2, and 4. I have tried to define intention* to be exactly the sort of state
needed to support premises 1 and 2 given 4. My aim is to make the inference to
conclusion 5 as plausible as possible.
If we assume that premise 1 and 4 hold then the only way to deny conclusion 5 is
to deny premise 2. That means giving up the best worked out theory of human
communication. This is something that some people are already committed
to, but they are not the target audience for the argument. Rather I intend
to convince those who think that premise 2 is worth preserving that it can be
preserved by accepting the notion of intention* and that this is a good reason to
develop a theory of intentions*.
There is some precedent for a notion like intention*. Firstly, Buchanan and
Gary Ostertag appeal to a similar notion, sloppy-intention in their defence of
Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions.10
Thus, in uttering g [(‘The guy’s late’)], S didn’t mean, indetermi-
nately or otherwise, any description-theoretic proposition. Neverthe-
less, S would, if asked to be more explicit, offer any one of a number
of such propositions. For example, though in uttering g S didn’t
mean that the author of Smells and Tickles is late, he would be happy
if A would, on the basis of this utterance, come to entertain this
proposition. S would, however, be equally happy if A were instead
to entertain the proposition that the guy reputed to have solved the
mind-body problem is late, or that the guy we are waiting for is late,
and so on. In general, S ’s communicative intentions, whatever they
are, will be satisfied if A entertains any one of these propositions.
To give this phenomenon a label, call such communicative intentions
sloppy meaning-intentions (henceforth we will use s-means for ‘sloppy
means’ and s-intends for ‘sloppy intends’). (Buchanan and Ostertag
2005, 902)
My proposal of intention* is inspired by Buchanan and Ostertag’s. I am also
happy to use the test proposed in the quoted passage as a rough diagnostic for
the presence of an intention* directed at P: the speaker’s happiness to accept
the audience’s entertaining of P (among other possibilities) as satisfaction of
their overall intention is evidence of their intention* directed at P.
There is also a notion in relevance theory that is similar to intention*: weak
implicature or its more general form weak communication. Weak implicature
10This is the connection to the literature on incomplete descriptions that I noted in section 3.
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is described in Wilson and Sperber (2004, sec. 4). According to Wilson and
Sperber’s relevance theory approach, implicatures are generated in order to
satisfy the standing assumption that communicating agents make utterances in
order to express relevant propositions. Very roughly, if the linguistic meaning
does not satisfy the expectation of relevance then a search for a implicated
content is triggered. If a proposition P must be entertained in order to secure
the relevance of the utterance then it is strongly implicated. If a range of
propositions are such that any one of them would secure the relevance of the
utterance but none of them are strongly implicated then they are all weakly
implicated. Communicative success relies only on the recovery of one or more
weak implicatures in that case.11
6.3 Indifference and intention
Assume that Underdeterminacy is true of the natural languages spoken by
humans, and that competent speakers know this at least tacitly. A rational,
co-operative speaker will know that a typical utterance of a sentence like (2)
will be compatible with a range of propositions. The context of utterance will
constrain these options along with the meaning of (2), but not down to one. The
audience will, even in the most perfect cases of communicative success, at best
entertain one of these propositions that is compatible with the constraints of
meaning and context.
A rational, co-operative speaker who knows these facts about language will have
to be in some sense indifferent about which of the propositions it is that the
audience entertains. This is the thought that motivates Buchanan’s argument.
The fundamental problem with the standard theory is that even
if the theorist appeals to vagueness (and indeterminacy) she cannot
adequately capture the special kind of generality and indifference
characteristic of the communicative intentions of a speaker uttering
sentences such as (2) . . . while retaining the two theses definitive of
her view. (Buchanan 2010, 356)
The view I am advocating is a way to accommodate this insight.
To knowingly utter (2) intending to communicate one of a proper subset of
the propositions fixed by its meaning and the context is to do something that
such a speaker knows is likely to fail. Rational agents don’t do that sort of
thing when they have other options. The speaker in this case does have other
options. They could utter a different sentence that imposes different, more
restrictive, restrictions on the propositions. That they did not is evidence that
their intentions were not more restrictive. So, they were indifferent among the
propositions determined by the meaning of what they uttered and the context
of utterance.
This does not prove that the speaker’s intentions were in fact intentions*. What
it does show is that an account is needed of how their intentions can be indifferent.
If the speaker has an intention towards the set of propositions and an intention*
towards each member of the set then indifference follows. This is supporting
evidence for an account in terms of intention*.
11I thank Robyn Carston for drawing this to my attention.
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6.4 Restrictions on intention
I will now offer support for the claim that the only communicative intentions that
a rational agent could have in the sorts of case under discussion are intentions*.
Wayne Davis and Neale have both argued that certain communicative intentions
are impossible (Davis 1992, 233–34; Neale 2005, 181).
The Davis–Neale point can be summed up in the form of an argument.
1. One cannot intend what one believes to be impossible.
2. Audiences do not directly access speakers’ intentions; they form hypotheses
about them based on the evidence they are given.
3. Competent speakers know premise 2.
4. A speaker expecting an audience to arrive at their intention without
evidence amounts to expecting the audience to access the speaker’s intention
directly, rather than through the evidence the speaker has provided.
5. The expectation in premise 4 would be an expectation of something im-
possible.
6. So, a speaker cannot intend to express a content by using a signal that
does not exploit the way in which the speaker’s audience will use that
signal in arriving at an interpretation of the speaker’s meaning.
Davis and Neale take premise 1 from their respective readings of Wittgenstein
and Grice (Grice 1971; Wittgenstein 2001). Premise 2 is a general constraint
on the way that utterances (or other signals) can be used to make manifest
communicative intentions. One cannot expect the audience to arrive at the
correct interpretation of the signal by magic; the signal must actually provide
a guide to the intended interpretation. If the argument goes through then we
have a constraint on speakers’ intentions.
This constraint will in turn motivate the move to intentions*. This is because
a straight-forward intention to communicate any one proposition, e.g. from
P1–P6, would be ruled impossible by the constraint. Given the other possible
propositions, the speaker would know that they are not providing the right sort
of evidence for their favoured proposition, and that will make the intention
impossible for them to form.
What this shows is that if we are going to have a theory of communication in
terms of intentions at all the intentions in question must have the properties I have
attributed to intentions*. It might turn out that philosophers and psychologists
working on intentions will provide a knock-down objection to intentions*, which
would in turn be a knock-down objection to the intention based account. In the
absence of such an objection anyone sympathetic to the intention based account
of communication will have to accept intentions*.
7 Relational attitude reports
7.1 Buchanan’s relational view
I have now presented two of the three responses to Buchanan’s argument that I
mentioned in section 1. I will now present my response to Buchanan’s argument
against a relational theory of attitude reports. He takes this argument to follow
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from the failure of the standard view; I will argue that there is a natural response
available to someone who accepts my amended version of the standard view.
A popular view is that attitude reports are relational: they report a relation,
such as belief, between a subject and a proposition that they believe. There
is a diversity of opinion on what propositions are, but any account of their
nature can count as relational; see Moltmann (2013, chap. 4) for a summary
(but not endorsement) of the view. Buchanan has a relational view that is not
propositional: he takes the relata of attitude reports to be subjects and certain
properties of propositions.
Here are two examples of attitude reports from Buchanan (2010, 362):
(4) Chet said that George W. Bush lives in Washington.
(5) Chet believes that George W. Bush lives in Washington.
Here is what Buchanan has to say about the examples.
[W]hile believing is a relation to propositions, the similarity between,
for example, (4) and (5), is that in both reports the semantic value of
the that-clause is a proposition-type, say [A]. The crucial difference
between saying and believing would then consist in the fact that,
while (4) is true just in case Chet said [A], (5) is true if, and only if,
Chet believes some proposition of the type [A]. On this suggestion,
the fundamental objects of our beliefs are not the contents of our
speech acts. (Buchanan 2010, 362–63)
I will formulate Buchanan’s point as the proposition-type thesis.
Proposition-type In both speech and belief reports the contribution of the
‘that’-clause to the proposition expressed by the report is a proposition-
type.
I have already argued that what we say are propositions, and I agree with
Buchanan that what we believe are propositions. I therefore deny his claim
quoted above that ‘the fundamental objects of our beliefs are not the contents of
our speech acts’. I also deny the remaining claim of the proposition-type thesis:
the semantic contribution of a ‘that’-clause to the proposition expressed by a
report, including belief reports, is a proposition.
In Buchanan (2010) the claim is that propositions are not the semantic values
of ‘that’-clauses, but they are what we believe (although not what we say).
I have focused on Buchanan’s earlier argument, but I intend the proposal in
subsection 7.2 to be an alternative to both the views that Buchanan has defended.
7.2 A multiple proposition relational view
The multiple proposition relational view is a simple generalisation of the multiple
proposition view applied to ordinary sentences. The guiding idea is that a
‘that’-clause picks out a proposition, and the report attributes a relation between
the subject and that proposition. These two examples report belief and hope,
respectively.
(6) Chet believes that every beer is in the bucket.
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(7) Chet hopes that every beer is in the bucket.
Because an utterance of the embedded clause ‘every beer is in the bucket’ (i.e.
(2)) would express multiple propositions, the reports (6) and (7) do too. They
express the propositions that the subject of the report believes each proposition
that would be expressed by an utterance of the embedded clause. Assuming
for simplicity that in the context of the report the propositions that would be
expressed by an utterance of the embedded clause are P1–P6, and that there is
no other source of propositional proliferation, the set of propositions expressed
by (6) will be: {belief(Chet, P1), . . . , belief(Chet, P6)}. The same will hold for
desire reports, speech reports, and all attitudes towards propositions.
An important feature of this view is that none of the propositions expressed by
the report has the set of propositions as a constituent. None of the things that
the reporter says is that the subject of the report believes a set of propositions.
Making the report therefore does not in any sense require the reporter to conceive
of such a set or have any kind of attitude towards it, nor does it suggest that
the subject of the report must do so in order for the report to be true.
This view has several advantages. Firstly, it is compatible with popular and
attractive views about attitude reports and the form of the propositions expressed
by them: the view therefore preserves the natural account of why Chet’s believing
that P and Tim’s believing that P entail that there is something that Chet
and Tim both believe. The account also preserves these entailment relations
across different attitudes. Secondly, there is no need to add any special semantic
machinery to deal with attitude reports. The account follows naturally from
a claim about what the embedded clauses express. Thirdly, this account is
compatible with many accounts of what propositions are. It can be accepted by
neo-Russellians or neo-Fregeans. The account is intended to be neutral on all
questions of the nature of propositions, including recent debates about the proper
conception of propositional truth (Recanati 2007; Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009;
MacFarlane 2014). All such views can be combined with the multiple proposition
view.
A final advantage of the view is that it provides a solution to a problem recently
raised by Delia Belleri (Belleri 2014, 2016). Belleri argues that, since natural
language sentences do not encode propositions, they cannot report fully proposi-
tional beliefs. The premise about encoding is supported by appeal to Carston’s
arguments. Belleri’s solution is that some of our thoughts are under specified in
the way that natural language sentences are. This conclusion solves the problem,
but it is a radical departure from standard views of the semantics of thought;
see e.g. Fodor (2001); Carston (2008). The multiple proposition relational view
suggests an alternative conclusion: a sentence of natural language that does not
encode a proposition is used to attribute a set of fully specific propositions as
the contents of a subject’s mental states.
One objection that might be raised to this account of attitude reports turns
on the determination of the propositions expressed by the report. The view
is that which propositions are expressed are determined by the context of the
utterance of the report. These may not match the propositions the subject
believes, or the propositions that they would express by an utterance of the
embedded clause in even a very similar context. However, this problem will arise
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for single proposition views as well. There is no reason to think that moving to a
multiple proposition view makes the problem any more troubling. For example,
there are issues that arise with the use of context sensitive language in reports.
These issues are no worse for the multiple proposition theorist, and they are free
to adopt any proposed solutions e.g. those proposed in Cappelen and Hawthorne
(2009). Furthermore, here is no reason to think that it would be any harder to
make true attributions of propositional attitude on this model. What is different
is that reporters typically say many things; each of these can be assessed for
truth or falsity.
8 Conclusion
There is good evidence that natural languages underdetermine what speakers
use those languages to express. I have argued that Underdeterminacy has conse-
quences for how philosophers should think about meaning and communication.
I have argued for a specific revisionary consequence: that utterances typically
express multiple propositions. This is a different revisionary consequence than
the one that Buchanan argues for, and preserves more of the traditional theory
of communication given in terms of propositions.
Buchanan argues against the standard view using Underdeterminacy as a premise.
But rejecting the standard view in the way he does is radically revisionary given
the background of theories that think of linguistic meaning and communication
in a propositional framework. This might motivate some theorists to reject
Underdeterminacy. I have defended an alternative response which revises the
standard view but is still propositional. This version of the multiple proposition
view is compatible with Underdeterminacy.
In the end, assessing the view defended in this paper will require weighing up
the benefits of a theory of communication in terms of propositions against the
costs associated with the revisionary consequences of the view. I have tried to
show that the revisionary consequences have few costs by giving an account
that mirrors the standard view as closely as possible, and departs from it only
in ways that can be defended. My conclusion is that the multiple proposition
view is therefore relatively uncostly. Abandoning theories of communication
based on propositions means getting rid of much more of the recent history of
philosophy of language Therefore, I recommend the multiple proposition view as
an alternative.
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